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 1 In the Appendix we list the protections that are evident from a survey of OECD countries. We recognise that the form of a country’s political and legal institutions and 
their implementation of the protections are critical features in determining the efficacy of any regime – and so this list is not a list of efficacy of protections. 
 2  Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 provides that ‘Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, 
property, or correspondence or otherwise.’ But this falls far short of protection of privately held property rights from the state, as our examples will attest. 
 3 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html).
1. Introduction
In the last decade politicians from across the political 
spectrum have talked about ‘transforming’ New 
Zealand from an economy focused on land-based 
industries to an economy focused on investment in 
technology-based and high-value-added industries 
by promoting investment in, and retaining New 
Zealand ownership of, businesses developed in 
New Zealand. In this paper we argue that the current 
approach to the protection of property rights in 
New Zealand runs contrary to this objective and to 
the more general objective of economic and social 
progress. 
New Zealand is distinguished by having among 
the weakest protection of private rights in the OECD, 
a history of confiscation of private property rights, and 
a long-standing failure to recognise the protection of 
the basic human right of property rights.1 The effect 
of this is to limit investment in resources and assets 
in New Zealand, increase the cost of contracting and 
the level of expenditure on lobbying of government 
(whether in order to protect property rights, or to 
promote private interests by having the government 
confiscate the rights of others), and reduce 
accountability in the management of resources – 
including natural resources and the environment.2 
The economic performance of the New 
Zealand economy will be greatly enhanced when a 
government moves to fill that gap in the basic human 
rights enjoyed by all New Zealanders. It can do so by 
providing effective legal mechanisms for individuals 
to seek just compensation should any property rights 
owned by them be appropriated by the state. 
In democratic societies there are tensions 
between the coercive and pre-emptive powers of 
the state and the rights and freedoms of individuals. 
Democracy is in itself no guarantee of the protection 
of rights, because it is precisely when democratically 
elected governments make popular changes to 
legislation or policies which deprive a minority in that 
society of some right or freedom that the existence of 
constitutional safeguards enforceable by the courts 
rather than politicians or officials become most 
important. Bills of human rights, typically in concert 
with written constitutions, provide both statutory 
protection for the rights of individuals and limitations 
on the coercive power of the state. The United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states, in its preamble, that the recognition of human 
rights is ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world’.3  These rights include freedom 
of speech as well as the right to own property and 
the right for individuals’ rights to be protected.  This 
requires compensation whenever the state uses its 
powers to confiscate those rights. 
In this paper we review the nature of property 
rights and the importance of requirements for just 
compensation when the state uses its powers to 
appropriate any of those rights. We briefly review 
the approach of OECD countries to enshrining these 
rights and contrast them with New Zealand’s. We 
consider the case for the inclusion of property rights 
in the New Zealand Bill of Rights and analyse the 
objections that have been raised to this approach. 
We consider a number of examples of full or 
partial confiscation of rights and the effect of such 
confiscations on the investment environment in New 
Zealand. The examples are neither exhaustive nor 
fully representative but do illustrate the wide and 
(sometimes) subtle range of possible ways in which 
the power of the state can be used to confiscate rights 
in the absence of comprehensive constitutional or 
statutory requirements for just compensation. 
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2. Property Rights, Eminent Domain and the 
Efficiency of Compensation for Takings
 4 For an overview of the economic 
literature on property rights, 
see: H Demsetz (1998) ‘Property 
Rights’ in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law Vol III pp144-155. Macmillan. 
  5 Certain of these theories explain 
the evolution of such rights 
as facilitating transactions and 
security in a way that enhances 
economic performance. For 
a taste of these arguments, 
see: Daniel Fitzpatrick (2006) 
‘Evolution and chaos in property 
rights systems: the Third World 
tragedy of contested access’ Yale 
Law Journal 115(5) pp996-1048; 
and James Krier (2008) The 
Evolution of Property Rights: A 
Synthetic Overview University 
of Michigan Law & Economics 
Olin Working Paper 08-021 [and] 
University of Michigan Public 
Law Working Paper 131 (available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1284424) pp08-021.
6 Ministry of Justice (available at 
www.justice.govt.nz/foreshore/
main3.html).
Property rights are ‘the socially acceptable uses to 
which the holder of such rights can put the scarce 
resources to which these rights refer’.4 From the 
perspective of economics, a property right provides 
the right to use resources for certain purposes, and 
the holder of a property right is the person or group 
with the ability to exercise the relevant rights. 
There is no simple match between allocations of 
property rights and the concept of ownership as it is 
used in popular language. The concept of ownership 
as it is popularly used is associated with a bundle of 
property rights; in particular to occupy and use the 
property, to enjoy the income generated from the 
legally permitted uses of the property, to exclude 
others from using the property, and to transfer 
control of some or all of the property rights to other 
owners and for whatever consideration is available. 
In practice, however, it is the last of these rights that 
most clearly defines ownership, since ownership 
could be retained even where use and exclusion 
rights were transferred through a lease or impaired 
by government action.
Understanding of the breadth of the application 
of the term property rights has been assisted by the 
fact that the term ‘intellectual property’, and the 
associated wide recognition of the property rights 
in ideas and creative works, has entered popular 
language. There is, nonetheless, little recognition 
that there are property rights in: 
(i) the choice among all legal uses of the asset and 
the freedom from politically imposed constraints 
on these uses of the asset;
(ii) the choice among all legal means of generating 
income from an asset, and the ability to retain all 
residual income generated by those uses; 
(iii) the freedom to exclude some or all third parties, 
and some or all uses which they might make of 
the asset; and 
(iv) the freedom to sell the asset to the highest 
bidder, or to otherwise enter into contracts to 
transfer and create legally permitted rights over 
the asset.
The breadth of these definitions, and the wide 
range of local and national government policies 
and decisions that may affect the value of rights so 
defined, is the basis for the proposition that legal 
protections are required for holders of all property 
rights, not just for the protection of rights associated 
with ownership.
Well defined, secure and properly enforced 
property rights ensure that economic agents have 
security in their ownership of property and in their 
ability to take decisions with respect to that property. 
These rights enhance the workings of the economic 
system by ensuring incentives are compatible with 
sustainable resource use and socially desirable 
outcomes. They also reduce the socially wasteful 
expenditure incurred in protecting property rights 
(through lobbying politicians for favourable policies 
and legislation) or in invoking extra-legal means 
of protecting and enforcing rights that are not 
recognised in law. 
Most theories of the origins of property rights 
rest on the argument that these rights are shaped 
by the norms of society that facilitate low-cost 
coordination where there is scarcity, potential conflict 
and external effects of actions. They recognise that 
property rights are not static but evolve over time 
with changes in society, economy and technology;5 
and that these rights are honed, iteratively over time, 
by court and legislative decisions. In particular, it is 
the independence of the courts in resolving disputes 
about the ownership of existing property rights, 
making rulings on compensation for the taking of 
these rights, and defining and allocating ownership 
of new property rights as they emerge from social 
or technical change that is particularly important for 
economic progress.
Customary rights are property rights which 
result from a long series of habitual or customary 
actions and which have, by such repetition and by 
uninterrupted acquiescence, acquired the force of 
law within society. Their legal place evolves under 
common law as decisions under that law shape 
and render more precise the extent and nature of 
the rights. This approach enables the progression 
of new rights as society, environmental conditions 
and technology evolve. The definition of customary 
rights utilised by the Ministry of Justice is a restrictive 
one although it reflects common usage of the term:6 
Customary rights are rights that pre-date 
Crown sovereignty and have been exercised 
ever since. That means they were in existence 
at 1840 and have continued to be exercised 
from 1840 to the present day. Customary 
rights are recognised by the common law 
along a spectrum, with territorial rights (i.e. 
rights of exclusive use and occupation) at 
Customary 
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property 
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7 For a summary, see: W A Fischel 
(1998) ‘Eminent Domain and 
Just Compensation’ in The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law Vol. II pp34-43. 
Macmillan.
8 H Demsetz (1998) ‘Property 
Rights’ in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law Vol. III p154. Macmillan.
9 Richard A Epstein (1985) Takings: 
Private Property and the Power of 
Eminent Domain p182. Harvard 
University Press.
10 ibid. p4.
one end and non-territorial rights (i.e. rights 
of use) at the other.
From a perspective focused on social and 
economic progress, our view is that a broader 
definition of customary rights is to be preferred – one 
which admits changes in rights over time, as society 
and technology changes and as resources become 
scarce and the environment better understood. To 
avoid the connotation of customary rights being 
derived only from the customs of indigenous peoples, 
we use the term presumptive rights as a general term 
encapsulating this evolution of rights, much in the 
same way as would occur under common law and 
evolving statutory requirements. 
Eminent domain is the power of government to 
take property regardless of whether compensation 
is paid. In most developed countries constitutional 
provisions or legal precedent create a requirement 
for just compensation to be provided to the owner 
of the rights. 
Internationally, a large literature has considered 
the economic efficiency of just compensation7 and 
has focused on five complementary ways of thinking 
about this issue: 
(i) the absence of a requirement for just 
compensation will result in public officials failing 
to consider the true cost of the regulations, 
policies or legislation that they have the power 
to implement. Unless they are required to 
provide compensation for the rights impaired or 
taken, the only costs that they will consider are 
the political costs associated with confiscating 
the rights of some group in society; and if that 
group does not have substantial electoral clout 
the costs will be small.
(ii) failure to provide compensation will result in 
over-use of the government’s power of eminent 
domain, since compulsory acquisition of 
property will be cheaper than alternative means 
of achieving the desired outcome. 
(iii) the threat of acquisition by government 
without just compensation will result in owners 
of property investing in the development of 
their property at less than the optimal level, or 
seeking investment opportunities overseas. 
Either of these actions will be to the detriment of 
the economy as a whole.
(iv) taking private property required for a public 
purpose without compensation is equivalent to 
funding that public purpose with a specific tax 
on a small number of individuals. Economists 
generally accept that such specific taxes have 
higher efficiency (‘deadweight’) losses than the 
broader taxes that would be required to pay just 
compensation.
(v) compulsory acquisition may be motivated by 
government responsiveness to the wishes of 
particular influential groups within society, and 
it may impose very high costs on a small number 
of individuals. Just compensation inhibits the 
ability of politically powerful groups within 
society to persuade the government to take the 
property and destroy the livelihood of groups 
with less political power. 
Government confiscation of rights, or even the 
threat of confiscation, will be treated by owners of 
assets as a threat to investment returns. This can 
have significant adverse effects on the long-term 
efficiency of society:8
Suppose, now, that the property right regime 
is one in which, for political or other reasons, 
there is a significant chance of expropriation 
of property rights. Now the appropriate 
interest rate by which to discount future 
returns must be raised to account for the 
greater risk that when these returns come 
in someone else will have acquired rights to 
them without having fully compensated the 
present owner for the right to do so. Where 
instability in ownership is greater, rational 
behaviour dictates the neglect of long-run 
investment opportunities. The impact of this 
on the economic progress of a society can 
be dramatic.
In some cases, government taking of property 
rights can be in the public interest; but, where this is 
the case, compensation to the property right holder 
is the appropriate mechanism to reflect the value lost 
by the right holder.
Economists normally assume that ‘just 
compensation’ is the compensation sufficient to 
make a property owner indifferent between retaining 
ownership and receiving the compensation offered. 
In practice this point of indifference is most easily 
defined by the amount that the owner would have 
received for those rights in voluntary exchange.9 
But the market value of the property in a voluntary 
exchange does not provide compensation for 
the compulsion associated with the purchase by 
government, and has resulted in some economists 
taking the view that compensation in excess of 
market value is justified in cases of compulsory 
acquisition.10  
Historically, regulated firms commonly had 
the feature that they were required to provide 
certain services and were restricted in the activities 
...government 
taking of 
property rights 
can be in the 
public interest...
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 11 J G Sidak and D F Spulber (1998) 
Deregulatory Takings and the 
Regulatory Contract. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 12  William A Fischel (1995) 
Regulatory Takings: Law, 
Economics, and Politics. Harvard 
University Press.
 13 Richard A Epstein (1993) 
referencing Nollan v California 
Coastal Commission 483 US 825 
(1987) in Bargaining with the 
State. Princeton University Press. 
14   Richard A Epstein (1998) 
referencing Lucas v South 
Carolina District Council 505 
US 1003 (1992) in ‘Takings’ in 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law Vol. III 
p567. Macmillan.
that they could undertake but in return were 
guaranteed agreed rates of return by the regulator. 
The international process of deregulation that 
has occurred in the past 25 years has spawned a 
large literature in economics and law relating to 
regulatory takings. The focus of this literature is on 
demonstrating that when firms make investments 
to provide services under a regulatory contract with 
government, breaches of the regulatory contract 
resulting from deregulation represent government 
takings from the owners of the regulated firm and 
require compensation.11 This literature follows 
from the proposition that takings need not involve 
compulsory acquisition of physical property but can 
also occur where a government uses its regulatory 
powers to constrain or remove the firm’s ability to 
generate income from its regulated activity.12
Governments seldom provide compensation 
for the devaluation of property rights created by 
burdensome but widely applicable regulation. But, 
where the burden of the regulation applies narrowly 
(to a small number of people) by comparison 
with a much larger group of beneficiaries, and 
where the effect of the regulation is to create the 
opportunity for the government to take property, 
then compensation for the taking is required. For 
example, if the government were to require, as a 
condition for exemption from specific regulations 
that it is invoking, that the owner of property 
‘voluntarily’ donate property to the government, 
then this is equivalent to a direct exercise of the 
government’s power of eminent domain and 
requires that compensation be paid.13 Further, where 
a specific government decision or change in policy 
denies the owner of property the ability to make an 
economically viable use of that property in the use 
for which it was purchased, then this represents a 
de-facto taking that requires compensation.14  
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15 Armen Alchian (2007) ‘Property 
Rights’ in The Concise 
Encyclopedia of Economics 
Second Edition (available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/PropertyRights.html).
16 For an analysis of the evolving 
situation in Australia, see: John 
Forbes (1995) ‘Taking Without 
Paying: Interpreting Property 
Rights in Australia’s Constitution’ 
Agenda 2(3) pp313-320.
17 Also in Australia, the state of 
Victoria has a bill of rights in 
place which protects private 
property rights (s 19 Victoria 
Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006).
18 The Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 is 
a statute of significance although 
it is not supreme legislation.  It 
provides:
 Recognition and declaration of 
rights and freedoms
1.  It is hereby recognised and 
declared that in Canada 
there have existed and shall 
continue to exist without 
discrimination by reason 
of race, national origin, 
colour, religion or sex, the 
following human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, 
namely,
(a) the right of the individual 
to life, liberty, security 
of the person and 
enjoyment of property, 
and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except 
by due process of law.
19 Bryan Schwartz and Melanie 
Bueckert (2006) ‘Regulatory 
Takings in Canada’ Washington 
University Global Studies Law 
Review 5 pp477-491.
Property rights allow human beings to have 
autonomy of action over their own property: rights 
holders can put property to the uses they desire, 
provided such uses are socially acceptable; and they 
can reap the rewards from those uses without fear 
of unjustified and uncompensated expropriation of 
their property rights by government. For this reason, 
property rights are no different from other human 
rights – such as the right to life and liberty, and the 
rights to freedom of expression and equality before 
the law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
explicitly recognises property as a human right 
where it states (Article 17):
(1) Everyone has the right to own property 
alone as well as in association with 
others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property.
Enforceable property rights are a requirement 
for freedom of social interaction, freedom in the 
ownership and use of property, justice in the 
way ownership rights are enforced, and orderly 
competition for resources. Thus property rights are 
themselves socially desirable, and this is augmented 
by their beneficial effects on economic performance. 
As economist Armen Alchian put it:15
Private property rights do not conflict with 
human rights. They are human rights. 
Private property rights are the rights of 
humans to use specified goods and to 
exchange them. Any restraint on private 
property rights shifts the balance of power 
from impersonal attributes toward personal 
attributes and toward behavior that political 
authorities approve. That is a fundamental 
reason for preference of a system of strong 
private property rights: private property 
rights protect individual liberty.
Our survey of the legislation specifying the 
human rights in the 30 OECD countries reveals that 
all but two  – Australia and New Zealand – provide 
property rights protection explicitly. A number also 
explicitly state that expropriation of property rights 
is not permitted without compensation. (Such 
legislation is typically the country’s constitution, but 
in some cases is a separate piece of human rights 
legislation. See the Appendix for more detail.)
New Zealand stands out as among those having 
the weakest protection. While Australia has no 
specific human rights legislation or human rights 
specified in its constitution, the latter does specify, in 
section 51(xxxi), that:
The Parliament shall, subject to this 
Constitution, have power to make laws for 
the peace, order and good government of 
the Commonwealth with respect to … the 
acquisition of property on just terms from 
any State or person for any purpose in 
respect of which the Parliament has power 
to make laws.
While the meanings of some of the terms in 
this clause have been controversial in the Australian 
courts (such as whether or not an ‘acquisition’ 
has occurred),16 the clause nonetheless provides 
constitutional protection for takings of property 
rights.17
In Canada there is protection for takings of 
property rights at the federal level,18 and several 
provinces have enacted statutes with explicit 
provisions for the protection of property. In Alberta, 
section 2 of the ‘Personal Property Bill of Rights’ 
prevents the acquiring of property by the Crown 
‘unless a process is in place for the determination 
and payment of compensation for the acquiring of 
that title’. Article 6 of Quebec’s Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms states that: ‘Every person has a 
right to the peaceful enjoyment and free disposition 
of his property, except to the extent provided by 
law.’ Despite arguments that these provisions ‘offer 
minimal protection’,19 they nonetheless provide 
some explicit recognition of property rights in excess 
of the level of recognition provided in New Zealand.
3. Property Rights as Human Rights
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4. Anticipating the Effect of Treating Property 
Rights as Human Rights in New Zealand
20 http://www.brookers.co.nz/bills/
defeated/b052551.pdf
21 F Bennion (2002) Statutory 
Interpretation p652ff. 
Butterworths. London.
22 Chilton v Telford Development 
Corporation [1987] 1 WLR 872
23 Attorney-General v De Keyser’s 
Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508, 
542.
24 Crown Law Office Attorney 
General Advice: New Zealand Bill 
of Rights (Private Property Rights) 
Amendment Bill No 2. 
25 An example of statutory 
prohibition on compensation is 
given in section 7 of the Forests 
(West Coast Accord) Act 2000 
[West Coast legislation], which 
states: ‘No compensation is 
payable by the Crown to any 
person for any loss of damage 
arising from the enactment or 
operation of this part.’
26 See, for example: John Burrows, 
Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd 
(2004) Law of Contract in New 
Zealand para 1.6 p9. LexisNexis. 
Wellington. Their argument is 
that much of common law in 
contract has been supplanted 
by legislation – including, in 
relation to the interwar years, ‘... 
legislation which interfered with 
existing contractual and property 
rights …’.
27 For example, the Electoral 
Finance Act 2007 contains, 
among other restrictions, the 
following expenditure caps 
during the regulated period: 
section 98 provides for a cap of 
$2.4 million on spending by a 
political party; section 78 a cap 
of $20,000 on spending by an 
electoral candidate; and section 
76 a cap of $4,000 on spending 
by a registered campaigning third 
party. An early version of the 
Electoral Finance Bill had much 
lower caps.
28 The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act (1990) section 5 provides ‘... 
the rights and freedoms contained 
in this Bill of Rights may be 
subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society’.
29 A Butler and P Butler (2006) 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act: A Commentary pp192-194. 
LexisNexis. Wellington. 
Protection from the state’s taking without 
compensation may be provided by common 
law, by a requirement of the constitution, or by 
specific legislation. For New Zealand, the absence 
of a constitution means that a natural location for 
this protection is its legislated Bill of Rights. The 
preamble to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(BORA) describes this legislation as being designed 
to ‘affirm, protect, and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in New Zealand’. 
From the development of the legislation in 
the late 1980s to the present day there have been 
attempts to include property rights in the BORA. The 
latest of these was in 2005 when a private member’s 
bill was put forward to provide for the inclusion 
of private property in the BORA. We use this bill, 
without analysis of it, as a basis for illustrating the 
issues involved. As we shall explain, the protections 
provided by BORA are not strong and other 
measures relating to institutional design should also 
be considered. 
The bill proposed to insert two new sections in 
the BORA:20
11A  Right to own property 
 Everyone has the right to own property, 
whether alone or in association with 
others.
11B Right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property
 No person is to be deprived of the use 
or enjoyment of that person’s property 
without just compensation.
Although the amendment was defeated, it is 
informative to consider its likely effects.
In the absence of a constitution the effect of 
including property rights as a human right should 
be compared to common law protections. In short, 
common law provides that: 
• there is a clear presumption against the 
imposition of a taking of a person’s property 
without explicit statutory justification;21
• any statute providing for an expropriation of 
property rights is interpreted in favour of the 
owner;22 and
• interference of property without compensation 
should not occur unless legislative intention to 
not compensate is unequivocal.23 
Thus common law provides that there should be 
compensation for interference with property rights, 
but not that there is a ‘right’ to compensation unless 
explicitly authorised by statute.24,25 While New 
Zealand governments have seldom been content 
to allow common law to work its course, common 
law remains the basic legal framework within which 
property rights and takings in this country are 
considered.26 
Adding property rights to New Zealand human 
rights legislation (the BORA) would not create 
legislation that is ‘supreme’. This is because the 
BORA, in section 4, ensures that it does not provide 
the basis for repealing or revoking a provision in 
another piece of legislation that is inconsistent 
with itself. The BORA does not limit the legislative 
programme, although it does require the legislature 
to report and explain whether proposed legislation 
is in accord with the BORA. Thus, the BORA does 
not preclude its elements being over-ridden in 
legislation. This is illustrated by the Electoral Finance 
Act 2007, which breached the BORA requirement 
of freedom of expression27 and yet was passed into 
legislation. From the experience of the Electoral 
Finance Act, it is apparent that legislation which has 
potential to breach provisions of the BORA may be 
reported to the House where it may be considered 
that the legislation is more or less important than the 
BORA (see section 528 of the BORA.)  This shows 
that the presence of the BORA does not preclude 
its elements being over-ridden in legislation. But it 
does raise consideration of provisions of the BORA 
in developing legislation. 
For their part, the courts have implemented 
section 6 of the BORA. This requires that they seek 
an interpretation of legislation which is consistent 
with the BORA, where that is possible.29
In sum, including property rights as an element 
of the BORA would guide court interpretations 
of legislation and promote greater public and 
legislative debate in connection with proposed bills 
that potentially involved takings of property rights.  
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The 2005 private member’s bill was ultimately 
defeated. The Justice and Electoral Select Committee 
(which considered the bill) recommended it not be 
passed, on the grounds that:30 
• the definition of certain terms (‘property’, 
‘deprived’, ‘use and enjoyment’) needed further 
work in order to be interpreted properly;
• the bill could complicate the legal interpretation 
of property rights, especially in relation to the 
Resource Management Act 1991; and
• the right to compensation could result in 
unintended costs incurred by government and 
local authorities.
In our view these reasons do not provide a 
credible basis for rejecting the proposed bill. The 
definition of terms specified in legislation invariably 
require interpretation as they are applied by the 
courts: after all, what does ‘freedom of expression’ 
(section 14 of the BORA) mean? As the passing of 
the Electoral Finance Act illustrates, New Zealand 
is just now defining the meaning of these words. 
Furthermore, it is apparent from the Appendix that 
most other nations do not shrink from the requirement 
to provide such interpretations. The second and 
third reasons given are strongly suggestive of why 
property rights should in fact be included in the 
BORA. They imply that it is Parliament’s view (again 
in contrast to that of many other countries) that 
more considered deliberation on takings issues by 
the legislature and courts would be too costly and 
constraining of state action to be contemplated. In 
the following sections we explain the substantial 
social and economic costs of this position.
30 The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Private Property Rights) 
Amendment Bill: Report 
of the Justice and Electoral 
Committee (available at 
http://www.parliament.nz/
NR/rdonlyres/0CC8C511-
6CD3-4297-B626-
471F4127546F/94022/DBSCH_
SCR_3871_6331.pdf)
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31 The government argued that this 
objective was complementary 
to, and not inconsistent with, 
the Land Act and CPLA – which 
appears to mean that it was 
an objective that could not be 
justified in terms of the explicit 
words in those Acts.
32 Preliminary Government 
Response to Report of the High 
Country Pastoral Leases Review 
(2006) para 7.
In this section we consider examples of takings 
in New Zealand. The examples are by no means 
exhaustive, but they do indicate that the takings 
issue:
• arises in a wide range of circumstances; 
• may appear subtly, and without explicit 
recognition that a taking of property arises;
• need not involve ownership;
• need not involve natural resources; 
• may involve institutions for which there is weak 
accountability; and
• is a contemporary one that rests on a long history 
of takings of property without just compensation 
in New Zealand.
5.1. Changes to Government 
Valuation Policy on Crown 
Pastoral Leases
A recent change in government policy relating to 
the basis for the valuation and determination of the 
rental for Crown pastoral leases has resulted in a 
taking of property rights held by the lessees.
Crown pastoral leases provide individuals with 
the right and obligation to undertake pastoral farming 
on high country land (leases normally being for 33 
years with rights of renewal in perpetuity and rental 
payments under the lease being reviewed every 11 
years). The leases are subject to the provisions of 
the Land Act 1948 and the Crown Pastoral Land Act 
1998 (CPLA). When read in conjunction with those 
Acts, the leases both permit and restrict a number 
of activities: they allow pastoral farming within the 
maximum stocking rates specified; they include 
restrictive covenants that preclude the lessee from 
benefiting from any potential building, subdivision, 
commercial or industrial activity; and they restrict a 
wide range of activities relating to pastoral farming 
and the development of other business activities 
such as those relating to tourism. The leases impose 
obligations on the lessee – including the obligations 
to reside continuously on the land, to farm the land 
diligently and in a husband-like manner according 
to the rules of good husbandry, to refrain from 
committing waste in any way, to control and manage 
vegetation on the land, to keep the land free from 
wild animals, rabbits and other vermin, and to 
properly clean and clear from weeds and keep open 
all creeks, drains, ditches, and watercourses on the 
land. Thus, the obligations and restrictions on the 
lessee are substantial. 
The rental rate on property value payable under 
the lease is fixed in legislation, so the rent payable 
varies with the value of the land (which is set every 
11 years and is exclusive of improvements). In 
August 2003 the government adopted the objective 
that it should ‘obtain a fair financial return … on its 
high country assets’, although this objective was not 
explicitly stated in the Land Act  or the CPLA.31 This 
resulted in a review of rent setting for pastoral leases 
which began in 2005. A report commissioned by 
LINZ identified that amenity values were not included 
in the valuations used to set rents for pastoral leases 
and recommended against including these values 
on the grounds that their inclusion might undermine 
the financial viability of pastoral farming. However, 
LINZ advised – and the government accepted – 
that subsequent rent reviews should be based 
on valuations which reflected full market value, 
including amenity values, and that financial viability 
issues should be considered separately. 
Concerns about the traditional valuation 
methodology arose in part from lobbying by interest 
groups such as the Federated Mountain Clubs and 
the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society:
… that the Crown is receiving rental from 
lessees at a level that does not fairly reflect 
the value of the land or a lessee’s rights under 
a pastoral lease. This view asserts that the 
right of exclusive access a lessee has to any 
amenity values is undervalued or ignored. 
Consequently, these stakeholders believe 
that the Crown when participating in tenure 
review is forced to pay a premium for land 
returned to full Crown ownership because 
the Crown’s interest is undervalued and 
the lessee’s interest is overvalued. In other 
words, there are concerns that lessees are 
unfairly benefiting from both concessionary 
rents and capitalising the benefits of lower 
than proper rents when parts of the leases 
are transferred back to the Crown pursuant 
to tenure review.32
Consideration of the valuation methodology also 
arose from the development of new government 
policy on the high country, expressed in part in the 
CPLA and extended through the development of 
explicit government objectives for the South Island 
high country in 2003. These objectives included: 
(i) ‘the protection of significant inherent values … 
preferably by restoration of the land concerned 
The effect of 
the inclusion of 
amenity values 
in the valuation 
base has been 
a substantial 
increase in the 
rents sought: 
on average, 
rents increased 
by 553% over 
the previous 
valuation date.
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33 For some lessees the rent 
increases reflect a move from 
1.5% of valuation to 2.25% of 
valuation, in addition to increases 
in the LEI (land exclusive of 
improvements) valuation base.
34 Minister for Land Information 
(2006) A Sustainable Future for 
the South Island High Country: 
Pastoral Leases Valuation 
Reviews: Report Back para 48.
35  ibid. para 47.
36 Preliminary Government 
Response to Report of the High 
Country Pastoral Leases Review 
(2006) para 30.
37 Note that in our view consultation, 
and the receipt of expert advice, 
is quite different from negotiation. 
This is especially true in the 
current situation, where the 
Crown rejected both the expert 
advice that it received and the 
views put by the pastoral lessees.
to full Crown ownership and control’; 
(ii) ‘to secure public access to enjoyment of high 
country land’; and 
(iii) ‘to obtain a fair financial return to the Crown on 
its high country land assets’. 
Where ‘obtaining a fair financial return’ could be 
interpreted as increasing rents to levels that made 
pastoral farming uneconomic, this would clearly 
promote objectives (i) and (ii) above by making it 
necessary for many lessees to enter tenure review 
or to offer concessions on public access; and, in 
respect of tenure review, it held out the prospect that 
valuations of the lessee’s interest to be purchased by 
the Crown would be lower.
The effect of the inclusion of amenity values in 
the valuation base has been a substantial increase 
in the rents sought: on average, rents increased by 
553% over the previous valuation date.33  The impact 
of the rent increases on the economic viability of 
pastoral farming was recognised by officials and the 
government while its new policy on valuation was 
being developed, and was assessed in the officials’ 
report to Cabinet in the following terms:
MAF advises that based on the average 
rental figure in the Report ($10.42 per 
stock unit for reviews between 2002 and 
2006), it is estimated that the typical high 
country property would struggle to generate 
sufficient funds to cover this cost. MAF’s 
farm monitoring results show that South 
Island merino properties generated sufficient 
returns in only two of the past seven years to 
support this level of rental payment (2000 
and 2001).34
The same report to Cabinet notes that while 
rents will become unaffordable for some pastoral 
lessees, they will be affordable for other lessees ‘who 
hold their land for lifestyle reasons, and the pastoral 
farming activities undertaken on their lease is not 
relied on for financial viability’.35 A large number of 
pastoral lessees whose farming operation was viable 
at the rents applying when they purchased their 
properties are now not financially viable; and they 
must sell some or all of their existing property rights 
to retain their leases.
Setting the rental at a level that requires best-
practice husbandry on the part of the leaseholder 
to generate a reasonable return on their investment 
in pastoral farming activities is efficient because it 
penalises those who are inefficient. Setting the rent 
at a level that even best-practice pastoral farming 
cannot meet, and which therefore requires the lessee 
to subsidise pastoral farming and land management 
obligations under the lease with income from other 
sources, is inefficient because it will: 
(i) encourage entry by those who can afford 
the subsidy rather than those who can most 
efficiently carry out the activities required by the 
lease; and
(ii) provide pastoral lessees with incentives to 
increase output above stocking rates stipulated 
in the lease or to reduce expenditure on farm 
management activities, contrary to the long-term 
management of the vegetation on the land. 
As officials noted in one piece of advice to 
government:
Unaffordable rent would serve neither the 
Crown as landowner nor lessees as this 
would place sustainable land management 
and the pastoral farming industry at risk.36
It might be argued that efficient pastoral farmers 
may be encouraged to enter or continue as Crown 
pastoral lessees by the prospect of capital gains when 
they sell the lease. However, this seems unlikely for 
two reasons. First, prospects for future capital gains 
will be reduced by the fact that the Crown has shown 
its preference for public acquisition of high country 
land, and by the signal that the Crown is willing to 
introduce new policies which attempt to limit the 
capital gains available to the lessees. Second, this 
argument requires either that lessees be able to 
generate sufficient income to pay their normal living 
expenses, or that they have mechanisms which 
allow them to borrow the money for living expenses 
while not making repayments secured by future 
capital gains. Since future capital gains are uncertain, 
financial markets offer such finance only at extremely 
high interest rates. 
The government introduced its new policy on 
the inclusion of amenity values in the valuations 
used to set the rents for pastoral leases in the 
full knowledge that this would have the effect of 
confiscating the net income from pastoral farming 
which previously accrued to lessees. The change 
in valuation procedures arose from a decision by, 
and use of the statutory power of, the Crown rather 
than from a process of negotiation or contractual 
agreement with lessees.37 This represents a use 
of eminent domain to take the property rights of 
the lessee; and as such it should not be enforced 
without provision for compensation to the lessee, as 
it fundamentally alters the relationship established 
under the lease.
The link between low rental payments, restricted 
land use options, and requirements to invest in a 
range of activities which supported government 
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38 In the case of pastoral leases, 
officials noted in their initial advice 
to government on these issues 
that: ‘Any review [of government 
objectives for the high country] 
would need to recognise the link 
between low nominal rentals and 
restricted land use options.’
39 This section is drawn primarily 
from Richard Boast (2008) Buying 
the Land, Selling the Land: 
Governments and Mäori Land 
in the North Island 1865-1921 
Victoria University Press. 
Wellington.
40 ibid. p29.
policy for the high country is a key element of the 
terms of a Crown pastoral lease.38 Until the recent 
change in government policy on valuations, the 
lessees were entitled to assume that the policy of 
low rental payments would continue to support the 
requirements for activity, and the restrictions on 
activity, that were specified in their lease. 
Allowing Crown pastoral lease valuations to 
be increased to reflect the highest and best use 
(effectively incorporating lifestyle valuations into the 
market for pastoral leases) is inefficient when the 
responses of the lessee are severely constrained. 
More-intensive pastoral farming is strictly 
circumscribed by requirements for permission to be 
obtained. But, unconstrained by regulation, lessees 
could respond to higher rents by erecting additional 
dwellings and making these available to individuals 
who place a high value on the amenity values of the 
high country, or by developing alternative intensive 
commercial uses that are more profitable than 
pastoral farming. Because these types of responses 
are ruled out under the terms of the lease, it is 
inefficient to include amenity values or otherwise 
require highest and best-use valuations as the basis 
for rental reviews without freeing the lessees from 
the constraints on the ways in which they may 
respond.
This example illustrates that a unilateral change 
to the government’s policy on the valuation basis 
removes the financial viability of pastoral farming 
and is a confiscation of rights – just as much as 
compulsory acquisition of real property (such as 
land) is a confiscation of rights. In defending the 
increases in rents for pastoral land resulting from 
the inclusion of amenity values, the government has 
frequently claimed that it will offer rent reductions 
in return for concessions from landowners such as 
public access. The Crown’s use of this provision to 
obtain concessions on access and other matters in 
return for remission of rent, or to push farmers into 
tenure review negotiations, involves a process of 
compulsion and thus is a removal of rights previously 
enjoyed by the pastoral lessee. 
In our view this taking of the lessee’s property 
right should be possible only if the lessee is 
compensated for the loss of income. This conclusion 
holds whether the taking is actually the destruction 
of the economic viability of the lessee’s pastoral 
farming by the change in the rent, or whether it is the 
taking of public access rights or conservation land in 
exchange for remission of the new rental charges 
back to the level at which pastoral farming is viable.
5.2. Acquisition of Mäori Land 
It is well known that to facilitate päkeha settlement 
of New Zealand a large amount of Mäori land was 
confiscated by the government, primarily during 
the 1860s; and there is widespread political and 
popular support for the processes put in place to 
provide compensation for the land acquired in this 
manner. It is, however, less well known that the 
primary mechanism through which Mäori land was 
‘purchased’ by the Crown also involved a substantial 
component of confiscation of property rights. 39
Mäori land was acquired under Crown 
pre-emption; a basic plank of British imperial 
constitutional law. Pre-emption was based on the 
idea that only the Crown could extinguish native 
customary titles. Without the Crown first interposing 
and extinguishing native title in some lawful manner, 
there could be no private ownership by the non-
indigenous settler population of New Zealand.
While Crown pre-emption had a constitutional 
rationale, the manner in which it was exercised created 
takings of property rights. Pre-emption created a 
monopsony which the colonial governments used to 
keep the prices paid for land at levels substantially 
below market value. The incentives for the colonial 
governments to act in this way arose because 
buying land from Mäori owners served both as a 
mechanism through which the colonial government 
raised revenue (when the land was sold to settlers at 
much higher prices) and as the vehicle by which fuel 
was provided to the driving force of expansion in the 
colonial economy – intensive agricultural settlement 
and cultivation of land under European methods: 
Pre-emptive purchase after 1847 was at 
least based on the notion that Mäori had title 
to the whole country. [But] the purchase 
often bore little resemblance to ordinary sale 
contracts, and the amount of consideration 
paid by the Government was often merely 
nominal, bearing little relation to market 
price.40
The result is described by Richard Boast as 
follows:
The Mäori estate was definitely lost for the 
proverbial mess of pottage. Selling land to 
the Crown simply cannot have generated 
significant capital for reinvestment, or 
indeed generated for the overwhelming 
majority anything deserving the name capital 
at all (perhaps investment credit might be a 
better term). Mäori might as well have given 
their North Island lands to the Government 
for nothing for all the economic difference 
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 41  ibid. p40.
 42  Richard Boast (2005) Foreshore 
and Seabed p5. LexisNexis. 
Wellington. The most recent 
example of such actions by the 
New Zealand government, the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 
is considered in a subsequent 
section of this paper.
 43  Our discussion of the ownership 
of petroleum and the Petroleum 
Act is drawn primarily from: 
Waitangi Tribunal (2003) The 
Petroleum Report. Legislation 
Direct. Wellington.
that it made. At the end of the day it made 
no real difference whether land was bought 
or was confiscated: [it] essentially amounted 
to the same thing, and grievance-settlement 
policies of the present day which give 
priority to confiscation claims would appear 
to be misconceived.41
As a basis for the purchase of Mäori land, Crown 
pre-emption had sound constitutional foundations 
and did not need to be exercised in a way that 
was confiscatory of property rights. However, 
New Zealand’s colonial governments used the 
monopsony power created by Crown pre-emption 
to acquire Mäori land at prices substantially below its 
market value, thus confiscating a portion of the value 
of the land that the Crown acquired from Mäori. 
This partial taking of property rights under Crown 
pre-emption not only creates a potential Treaty 
claim for compensation under the special provisions 
of the Treaty of Waitangi Act; it also illustrates the 
importance of having constitutional grounds (which 
would thus be available to all New Zealanders) for 
the protection of property rights and for redress 
when these rights are confiscated by government. 
5.3. Nationalisation of Petroleum
Today landowners in New Zealand recognise that 
most minerals under the land for which they own 
the fee simple are the property of the Crown. 
However, it is not widely known that this allocation of 
ownership rights is a creature of statute rather than 
the common law and that it derives from a series of 
Acts which confiscated without compensation the 
property rights of landowners. Indeed, New Zealand 
governments have a long history of confiscating 
private property rights in key natural resources and 
vesting these in the Crown once their value becomes 
apparent.42 The primary examples of statutes vesting 
natural resources in the Crown are the Water Power 
Act 1903 section 3 (right to use water in lakes, falls, 
rivers etc for the purpose of generating or storing 
electricity); Petroleum Act 1937 (all petroleum); 
Atomic Energy Act 1945 (all uranium); Coal Act 1948 
section 3 (all coal – but this provision was reversed in 
1950); Geothermal Energy Act 1953 section 3 (right 
to tap, take, use and apply geothermal energy); 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 section 21 
(sole right to dam rivers or streams, or divert or take 
natural water, or discharge natural water or waste 
into natural water); Mining Act 1971 (all gold and 
silver). 
In each case confiscation of private property 
rights was usually justified as a necessary response 
to complex allocation and resource management 
problems. But on closer examination the claimed 
necessity for the extinction of private rights never 
proves to be credible, for two reasons:
(i) allocation and management issues are unlikely 
to create an absolute requirement that private 
property rights in the resource be removed; 
and
(ii) even if they did, compensation could be paid 
to owners of the private property rights confis-
cated.
By way of illustration, we examine the 
confiscation by the New Zealand government of 
private rights in petroleum.
By the 16th century the maxim ‘cuius est solum 
eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos’ (to whom 
belongs the soil it is his, even to heaven and to the 
middle of the earth) had become accepted doctrine 
in English law and, in the absence of statutes over-
riding it, has been applied consistently by the New 
Zealand courts in determining the ownership of 
natural resources.43 Also relevant to the ownership 
of petroleum is the common law doctrine of capture 
– which provides that an owner is unable to stop a 
neighbour draining from under that owner’s property 
a resource which will flow to a point of low pressure, 
as long as the means of extraction remain on the 
property of the neighbour. As with other common 
law property rights, landowners could alienate 
rights to the petroleum under their land through 
agreements with oil companies which provided for 
the landowner to be paid royalties; and there were 
examples of such transfers of rights in New Zealand 
before the passing of the Petroleum Act.
Despite the passage of a number of statutes 
and regulations relating to the extraction of minerals 
from 1892 to 1926, the common law was left 
untouched: licensing regimes and royalties applied 
only to minerals extracted from Crown land, and the 
strategic significance of oil was recognised by giving 
the Crown a priority right of purchase in times of 
emergency as well as the capacity to take over the 
management of the entire operation of production 
in the event of war. A failed bill introduced in 1927 
proposed giving the Crown the ability to provide 
mining rights on land without the consent of the 
owners of the fee simple; but the royalties from any 
viable discovery were to be payable to the owner(s) 
of the fee simple and so the property rights of the 
landowners who had petroleum underneath their 
land was recognised by this bill.
In 1937 the New Zealand government introduced 
and passed a bill that shifted the determination of 
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45 This is the justification for 
confiscation presented to the 
Waitangi Tribunal by Crown 
witness G R Hawke (ibid. p35). 
46 3 NZLR 643.
47 See Richard Boast (2005) 
Foreshore and Seabed. 
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ownership of petroleum from the common law to 
statute; and it expropriated all petroleum resources 
in New Zealand to the Crown. The increasing 
importance of oil to run all forms of transportation 
(national and international) as well as the growing 
strategic threat from Japan and Germany caused the 
New Zealand government to focus on the need to 
increase investment by international oil companies 
in the discovery and extraction of New Zealand’s oil 
reserves – and on the ability of those companies to 
deal with a single owner (the government) as being 
‘in the national interest’. Vesting of the royalties 
obtained in the owners of the fee simple was 
considered, was left open in the passage of the Act 
in 1937, and ultimately was rejected in 1938. Mäori 
claims for rights to the royalties under the Treaty 
of Waitangi were rejected on the grounds that 
confiscation was being applied equally to Mäori and 
päkeha land owners.
The appeal to economic and security interests 
found broad appeal within Parliament and around 
New Zealand, but there was no unanimity on 
whether confiscation was required to achieve the 
government’s objectives. As the Waitangi Tribunal 
noted, ‘Mäori shared in the wider endorsement, and 
their challenge was not to the intent to nationalise 
the resource but to the failure to pay landowners 
compensation for their loss of property rights under 
the common law and the Treaty’.44 The claim that 
Mäori did not know of the location of petroleum or 
its potential value at the time of the signing of the 
Treaty of Waitangi is easily dismissed as a ground 
for confiscation: property rights are residual claims 
and thus do not need to explicitly anticipate every 
use in which the resource might be valuable. But the 
government could not, of course, easily accede to 
the claims of Mäori without also recognising claims to 
compensation from all private land owners. Claiming 
technical difficulties in identifying appropriate 
beneficiaries and doubts about the boundaries of 
ownership (because oil was not fixed in its location 
below individual parcels of land), the government 
chose to pursue confiscation of private rights as the 
simplest and best solution.45 
The approach of the government in 1937 and 1938 
was based on the position that, where the ‘national 
interest’ justified action and where the owners of the 
confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the 
national benefits of the policy, no compensation for 
the loss of private property rights need be paid. This 
position will, however, only be justified if it can be 
shown that those affected by the confiscation of the 
private rights will receive benefits roughly equivalent 
in value to the share of the benefits that they would 
have otherwise received. In this case, of course, no 
such analysis was done. However, complex economic 
models are unlikely to be required to support 
the simple proposition that if petroleum were as 
strategically important (and thus as valuable) as the 
government’s focus on the need for nationalisation 
suggested, then the private losses from confiscation 
would far exceed the share of national benefits which 
landowners obtained from the Act.
5.4. Foreshore and Seabed
One of the most contentious legislative provisions 
in recent New Zealand history is the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004 (FSA). This legislation had its 
origins in:
(i) a long history of controversy about property 
rights over the foreshore, fuelled by a confusing 
mixture of common law and statutory provisions 
with application to this territory; 
(ii) an increasing perception, as the intensity of 
interest in the various uses of the foreshore and 
seabed increased with growing population and 
changes in technology (such as those associated 
with marine aquaculture), that the ‘coast’ is a 
scarce resource; and 
(iii) the decision in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa 
[2003],46  which confirmed that the Mäori Land 
Court did have jurisdiction to issue titles to the 
foreshore and seabed.47 
The FSA was a response to Ngati Apa and to 
the prospect that the Mäori Land Court might issue 
private titles to the foreshore and seabed. The 
response vested in the Crown the full legal and 
beneficial ownership of the public foreshore and 
seabed, effectively extinguishing native customary 
title to the foreshore. The FSA can also be interpreted 
as an abandonment of any claim by the Crown that 
the foreshore and seabed was vested in the Crown 
before November 2004, and thus that the decision 
of the Court of Appeal (that it was land over which 
Mäori customary title had not been extinguished, 
and over which the Mäori Land Court had power to 
make status and vesting orders) was correct. But the 
FSA (section 12) withdrew any power to consider 
foreshore and seabed issues that might have been 
conferred by the Court of Appeal in Ngati Apa. 
The FSA was controversial because the Crown 
had not exhausted all options to appeal Ngati 
Apa and because the Act made no provision for 
compensation (except where local authorities have 
suffered loss). The approach of the Crown to any 
claim for compensation would be that, since the FSA 
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combines statutory extinguishment of common law 
rights with new procedures providing for recognition 
and enforcement of customary rights, compensation 
should not be considered. Whether recognition 
and enforcement of customary rights in the context 
of removal of any claim to ownership is sufficient 
to remove any equitable claim on compensation is 
unclear. But there can be little doubt that an alternative 
path, which attempted to achieve the government’s 
policy objectives in a negotiated outcome with Mäori, 
would have required that compensation be paid. 
Thus, in our view, the FSA must be interpreted as 
confiscating property rights without compensation. 
The fact that popular concern about public access 
to the foreshore assisted passage of the legislation 
makes it all the more clear why it is so important for 
any country to have constitutional provisions for just 
compensation enforceable by the courts in response 
to legislative takings.
5.5. Treatment of Pre-1990 Forests 
under the Kyoto Protocol
The treatment of ‘pre-1990’ forests under the 
New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a 
recent example of a regulatory taking. It has had a 
deleterious effect on economic efficiency which in 
this case includes adverse effects on the state of the 
environment. 
The present situation is encapsulated in the 
September 2008 amendment to the Climate Change 
Response Act 2002 that provides for the ETS. 
The ETS, in broad terms, implements a system of 
tradable emissions permits (known as ‘New Zealand 
Units’ or NZUs) designed to reduce New Zealand’s 
greenhouse gas emissions and meet its obligations 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The ETS makes the 
distinction, consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, 
between pre-1990 forests (which were planted on 
or before 31 December 1989) and post-1989 forests 
(planted after 31 December 1989). Pre-1990 forest 
owners who harvest their land and do not replant it or 
allow it to regenerate are required to purchase NZUs 
to cover the deforestation emissions from harvesting; 
these forest owners are also not eligible to earn any 
NZUs for carbon sequestration from their forests. By 
contrast, post-1989 forest owners can elect whether 
or not they wish to be a participant in the ETS in the 
first place – and, even when they do participate, they 
can earn NZUs for carbon sequestration from their 
forests and these can be used to offset the purchase 
of NZUs from deforestation emissions.
The taking arose immediately when the New 
Zealand government signed the Kyoto Protocol: 
by doing this it agreed to terms of the Protocol 
and took ownership of sequestered carbon in New 
Zealand trees planted prior to 1 January 1990.48 The 
Kyoto Protocol recognises private ownership of 
carbon sequestration only in forests planted since 
1 January 1990;  and, while the Protocol does allow 
some (capped) level of pre-1990 sequestration 
to be recognised,49 the New Zealand government 
elected not to account for this.50 By taking the 
rights to sequestered carbon, the government 
removed the benefit of carbon sequestration from 
tree owners and took the benefits and costs of 
carbon sequestration unto itself. Since that time the 
government has struggled to provide incentives for 
forest owners to manage their forests in a manner 
that reflects the value of current and prospective 
sequestered carbon. In consequence of this taking, 
there is almost certainly less sequestered carbon 
in New Zealand forests in 2009 than there would 
have been had the sequestered carbon remained in 
private hands. 
The rationale for the 1990 break-point in the 
Kyoto Protocol is claimed to be attributable to a 
problem that arose with applying a ‘net-net’ approach 
to accounting for forest sinks.51 Under this approach, 
both the emissions target and the actual emissions 
themselves in CP1 (the first Kyoto commitment 
period, being 1/1/08-31/12/12) are calculated on 
a net basis whereby removals of greenhouse gases 
by forest sinks are subtracted from gross emissions 
to obtain net emissions. The ‘logic problem’52  with 
such an approach is that a country may reduce its 
gross emissions in CP1 relative to its emissions target 
but (because the carbon uptake of forests slows over 
time) its removals may also fall in CP1 relative to 
removals in the emissions target – so that, on a net 
basis, its net emissions actually increase.
Notwithstanding that this net-net approach 
both represents the actual net carbon emissions 
that a country produces and provides incentives 
for investing in forestry (to ensure net emissions 
do decrease), an alternative was proposed. That 
alternative was a ‘gross-net’ approach, where the 
emissions target is based on gross emissions while 
CP1 emissions are calculated on a net basis. Thus, if 
gross emissions fall during CP1 relative to the target, 
net emissions will also fall for any non-zero CP1 
removals. However, this created its own problem – 
the so-called ‘gross-net emissions loophole’.53  Since 
removals are only accounted for in calculating CP1 
emissions, a country with a high volume of removals 
may easily achieve its emissions target even if gross 
emissions have increased. The effect of this is to 
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54 ibid. p8.
55 New Zealand Government (2007) 
Treatment of Pre-1990 Forests 
in the New Zealand Emissions 
Trading Scheme Briefing for 
the Climate Change Leadership 
Forum (http://www.mfe.govt.nz/
publications/climate/treatment-
pre-1990-forest-nz-ets-dec07/
treatment-pre-1990-forest-nz-ets-
dec07.pdf).
56 For example, see: Manuel 
Estrada, Esteve Corbera and 
Katrina Brown (2008) How do 
regulated and voluntary carbon-
offset schemes compare? Tyndall 
Centre for Climate Change 
Research Working Paper 116. 
The authors describe ‘voluntary 
carbon offset’ transactions where 
the carbon sequestration from 
forestry has been (voluntarily) 
purchased by emitting firms to 
offset their carbon emissions. 
Some of these transactions 
occurred as early as 1989.
57 The ‘locking in’ would be affected 
by the fact that the pre-1990 
forests were close to maturity at 
the date of the ETS and thus had a 
low rate of carbon sequestration. 
It would also be affected by how 
long after harvest the reversion is 
required before the obligation to 
pay the tax is extinguished (under 
ETS this is 8 years). 
58 This discussion presumes that the 
price of sequestered carbon was 
created by New Zealand policies: 
this is difficult to argue. 
weaken the incentive to reduce gross emissions, 
since the target can instead be met by relying on 
removals in CP1 that are not otherwise accounted 
for in the target. It is estimated that allowing credit 
for emissions removals from all forest sinks would 
have weakened the effect of the emissions targets 
by 10%.54
The approach established as a means of 
(partially) avoiding the gross-net emissions loophole 
was to allow credit on a net basis in CP1 for only some 
removals by forest sinks. The weakening effect would 
therefore be lessened to some extent. To achieve 
this, the arbitrary cut-off of 1990 was determined 
such that only the harvest of forests planted since 
1990 counted towards CP1 sequestration removals.
Having signed the Kyoto Protocol, the New 
Zealand government could nonetheless have 
established different rules under the ETS than under 
the Protocol, by allocating the rights to carbon 
sequestration to forest owners but bearing the cost 
of the mismatch between New Zealand policy and 
the Kyoto Protocol itself (which would ultimately 
be borne by the broad population of New Zealand 
taxpayers). It could have established different rules 
under the ETS in one of two ways:
• exempting pre-1990 forests from the ETS 
altogether (in this sense the rights to carbon 
sequestration would be placed in the hands of 
forest owners, and they could voluntarily enter 
into agreements to trade those rights); or
• allocating pre-1990 forests carbon sequestration 
credits under the ETS to forest owners (so that 
the rights to carbon sequestration would still be 
placed in the hands of forest owners; but, under 
the ETS, the owners would have an obligation to 
surrender sufficient rights to cover deforestation 
emissions).
The government did not implement either of 
these approaches. Rather, it fixed consistency of the 
ETS with the Kyoto Protocol in such a way that rights 
to carbon sequestration are taken from forest owners. 
The stated rationales for this approach are:55 
• By exempting pre-1990 forests from the ETS 
altogether, the costs of deforestation under 
the Kyoto Protocol would be borne by the 
government and ultimately the taxpayer. In 
addition, it is argued that this approach would 
remove the incentives on pre-1990 forest 
owners to reduce deforestation, as there would 
no longer be a mandatory requirement for 
pre-1990 forest owners to hold carbon credits 
and surrender a sufficient number to cover their 
emissions from deforestation.
• With carbon sequestration credits being 
allocated under the ETS, pre-1990 forests will 
earn fewer sequestration credits than post-1989 
forests (since trees have less ability to sequester 
carbon as they age). The government argued 
that this would create a significant carbon 
liability upon harvesting – which would force 
forest owners either to leave the trees in place 
in perpetuity or to manage the forest on a 
rolling selective-harvesting basis in order to 
limit the liability. Either way, the government 
argues, it locks forest owners into a lower-value 
commercial use.
Neither of these reasons stands scrutiny. The 
first presumes that there will be deforestation; but, 
under secure property rights, deforestation will 
be determined by the value of all uses of the land 
including carbon sequestration. It seems to presume 
an absence of value in carbon sequestration: that 
is, an absence of private and public instruments for 
carbon. Where such instruments exist (which they 
do internationally, independent of ETS56), forest 
carbon sequestration would have value and would 
affect forest owners’ incentives to plant and harvest. 
Further, there is the implication of classic taking: the 
social costs of deforestation should not be borne by 
society, but by a sub-group in society (and one that 
has invested in a long-lived productive asset).
The second reason, as given, is exactly why 
allocating the NZUs to existing forest owners would 
provide socially desirable incentives. It would have 
the effect of ‘locking in’ sequestered carbon in a way 
that its extent would be affected by the relative prices 
of carbon and other derived prices for land use.57 
This would particularly be the case if technologies 
for measuring sequestered carbon beyond harvest 
were developed. Under the ETS the same issue 
arises for pre-1990 and post-1989 forests: all forests 
mature at some stage. Moreover, to allocate no 
carbon credits for sequestration in pre-1990 forests 
increases the liability at harvest, and, as explained 
below, locks land into its existing use while at the 
same time limiting the incentives provided by carbon 
prices and property rights to carbon. 
A further reason proposed for the taking of 
sequestered carbon by the government is that by 
signing the Kyoto Protocol the government was 
creating the value in the sequestered carbon and 
thus that it had some right to this value.58  However, 
it is the role of government to govern in a way 
that promotes social and economic progress. In so 
doing it has the instruments of taxes, subsidies and 
regulations that it can utilise to manage externalities 
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59 A parallel can be drawn with the New 
Zealand government’s negotiation 
of reduced tariffs under a free trade 
agreement, or its negotiation of 
import quotas. In neither case is 
there an argument for consequently 
taxing exporters; and in both cases 
to put such a tax in place would 
provide incentives for socially and 
economically inefficient responses by 
exporters.
60 See also: MAF Policy (2006) 
Sustainable Land Management and 
Climate Change: Options for a Plan 
of Action . Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry. This estimates the tax at 
$13,000 per hectare using a carbon 
price of $15.92 per tonne.
61 If the carbon price is higher, 
this calculation will significantly 
underestimate the amount of the 
deforestation tax. See, for example: 
http://www.carboncalcs.com/nz/
kyotocosts.htm#, which calculates 
the total value of the forest emissions 
liability. Assuming a carbon price of $40 
per tonne and carbon emissions of 734 
tonnes per hectare of deforestation 
from a 28-year-old forest, it arrives at a 
deforestation tax for pre-1990 forests 
of approximately $28,000 per hectare. 
While it reports the aggregate value of 
carbon taken from private owners of 
pre-1990 exotic forests (allowing 39 
NZUs per hectare) to be approximately 
$22 billion, at this price of carbon the 
market value would for various reasons 
be less – but it would nevertheless be 
very substantial. 
62 The maximum free allocation of 
NZUs applies to pre-1990 forest land 
purchased before 31 October 2002. 
Pre-1990 forest land purchased after 
that time is allocated only 39 NZUs 
per hectare. Note that the ETS does 
not specify the exact number of NZUs 
freely allocated to pre-1990 forest land 
purchased before 31 October 2002, but 
rather specifies a formula for calculating 
this number. The commentary in the 
Climate Change (Emissions Trading 
and Renewable Preference) Bill as 
reported back from the Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee in June 
2008 notes (p.17) that the estimated 
allocation is 60 NZUs per hectare 
(commentary retrieved 17 December 
2008 from http://www.parliament.
nz/NR/rdonlyres/B4FA49FF-434E-
4164-A3DE401ECA0FAFA1/94330/
DBSCH_SCR_4086_60297.pdf).
63 37 Degrees South Limited and 
Cognitus Advisory Services Limited 
(2008) Mäori Impacts from the 
Emissions Trading Scheme: Detailed 
Analysis and Conclusions. A paper 
prepared for the Ministry for the 
Environment (available at http://www.
mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/
maori-impacts-analysis-conclusions-
jan08/index.html).
64 In fact at the time of planting there is a 
long time to harvest and a great deal of 
uncertainty about the performance of 
the trees – such as their susceptibility 
to wind-blow and the evolution of 
substitute materials – and about their 
ultimate use. Even in 1988 there 
may have been some expectation 
of changes in tree value arising from 
carbon sequestration.
65 The deforestation tax was imposed 
from 1 January 2008 but was 
announced by the government well 
before this time. As a result, there was a 
rush to deforest prior to 1 January 2008 
as a means of avoiding the tax. See, for 
example: Bruce Manley (2008) 2007 
Deforestation Survey: Final Report 
p.19, where the author states that 
‘Forest land-owners have responded by 
accelerating the level of deforestation 
in order to beat the 31 December 
2007 deadline. Overall the level of 
deforestation (19,000 ha) in 2007 is 
well above the 13,000 ha in 2006 and 
the forecast of 13,000 ha for 2007 that 
was made at the end of 2006.’ 
 66 Hon Dr Michael Cullen ‘Strategic assets 
to be protected in national interest’. 
Media statement 3 March 2008 
(available at http://beehive.govt.nz/
release/strategic+assets+be+protected
+national+interest).
and thereby foster this goal. There is no presumption 
that a policy which enhances social and economic 
welfare and which creates wealth for a subset of 
society should penalise the wealth of this sub-group 
(except by means of the existing tax system). To 
it put another way: if policies are to be materially 
guided by the benefit they provide the Crown, they 
will no longer have the purpose of enhancing social 
and economic welfare. The taking of sequestered 
carbon by the Crown has, as we explain below, 
distorted forest and land management such that it 
has provided less rather than more sequestered 
carbon in 2008 – which, accepting the carbon dioxide 
externality, means that this taking has engendered a 
real social cost.59
The effect of the treatment of pre-1990 forests 
under the ETS is to impose a tax on forest owners 
who wish to deforest and who could otherwise sell 
their sequestered carbon. Considering only the 
case of deforestation, and assuming both a carbon 
price of $25 per tonne of CO
2
 emissions and 800 
tonnes of CO
2
 emissions from deforestation of one 
hectare of mature radiata pine forest, the amount 
of this tax for pre-1990 deforestation has been 
estimated at approximately $20,000 per hectare of 
forest land deforested.60,61  While the government 
has proposed some compensation, this is negligible 
– a free allocation of NZUs to a maximum of 60 per 
hectare of pre-1990 forest,62  which provides for 
only 60 tonnes of carbon emissions from one hectare 
of deforestation (compared with the standard 
assumption of 800 tonnes of emissions per hectare 
of deforestation).
The cost of deforestation is unavoidable for 
pre-1990 forest owners who wish to deforest 
pre-1990 forest land at some point in the future, 
even if on another forest rotation. That is, even if 
pre-1990 forests are harvested and replanted, the 
replanted-forest land remains under the pre-1990 
regime and thus any later deforestation remains 
subject to the purchase of NZUs. It is also difficult 
for forest owners to reduce the deforestation tax 
by replanting and then deforesting the immature 
trees: if a forest is replanted then deforested before 
the trees reach the age of eight years, the deemed 
amount of carbon stored in the trees will be that 
stored in the previously harvested crop, not in the 
immature crop.63
The treatment of pre-1990 forests under the 
ETS amounts to a regulatory taking: it attenuates 
the property rights attending pre-1990 forests by 
devaluing any sequestered carbon options to forest 
owners and imposing a deforestation tax on forest 
owners which would not have been contemplated 
at the time of purchase of the forest. To consider 
deforestation only: at the time a pre-1990 forest 
was purchased or planted, its value would have 
incorporated the value of the option to deforest and 
convert to an alternative (higher value) land use at 
some point in the future.64 This option value would 
have included all the expected costs and benefits 
associated with deforestation. 
The effect of this regulatory taking is to lock pre-
1990-forest land into its existing use, by significantly 
increasing the cost of deforestation and conversion 
to a (potentially) higher-value land use. The result is 
that land is not allocated in an economically efficient 
manner: the flexibility of land use to shift to where it 
is most highly valued is lost.
In addition, the treatment of pre-1990 forest will 
not have the desired effect on net carbon emissions.65 
If the goal of an emissions policy were to reduce New 
Zealand’s net carbon emissions into the foreseeable 
future, it would do this both by discouraging 
deforestation and by encouraging planting and tree 
growth (the latter being via forest management 
techniques). While the treatment of pre-1990 forests 
attempts to internalise the social cost of deforestation 
(albeit in a manner that severely attenuates property 
rights), it does not internalise the social benefit of 
carbon sequestration from planting and tree growth. 
Accordingly, while being locked into a pre-1990 
forest land use, these forest owners will have 
diminished incentives for planting and for optimal 
forest management. Their incentives here reflect 
only the private benefits and not the social benefits 
that ownership in this case would confer. A further 
distortion to incentives arises from the transparent 
willingness of the government to attenuate the 
owners’ rights with negligible compensation. The 
taking that has occurred in forestry raises the spectre 
of future takings, thereby raising the risk of long-
lived investments and reducing incentives to invest 
in forestry and elsewhere.
5.6. Auckland International Airport 
Limited
In December 2007 the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board (CPPIB) made a partial takeover 
offer for a 40 percent shareholding in Auckland 
International Airport Limited (AIAL). In March 2008, 
as a result of the ‘uncertainty and debate’ surrounding 
the CPPIB offer,66 the government announced an 
amendment to the Overseas Investment Regulations 
to add an additional factor to be taken into account 
in assessing whether an overseas person or entity 
Page 16 – Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation: An Economic Analysis of the Most Fundamental Human Right Not Provided in New Zealand
 67 TVNZ ‘Cullen defends 
investment rule change’. News 
story 6 March 2008 (available 
at http://tvnz.co.nz/view/
page/1320238/1618678).
68 New Zealand Business Roundtable 
and Wellington Regional 
Chamber of Commerce. Letter to 
Regulations Review Committee 
dated 17 March 2008.
69 Complaint regarding the 
Overseas Amendment Investment 
Regulations 2008. Report of the 
Regulations Review Committee, 
September 2008.
70 The Regulation Review 
Committee’s response to the 
NZBRT and WRCC submission 
included the argument that the 
regulation trespasses unduly on 
personal rights and freedoms. 
It agreed with the Treasury that 
a loss in share value does not 
amount to a taking and that share 
value fluctuation is ‘something 
that shareholders simply have 
to accept’. This latter point is 
wrong: the drop in share price 
was predictable, given the 
government’s change in the 
rules; and it was the effect of the 
taking, resulting from the loss 
of shareholders’ rights to sell to 
overseas interests.
71 Commentators have suggested 
that the government treatment 
of railways has nationalised rail 
by, among other things, making a 
generous payment for the rolling 
stock at the exit of Toll Holdings 
(the Australian Company that 
held rail). See, for example: Brian 
Gaynor ‘Government Toll buy a 
sad indictment’ The New Zealand 
Herald 10 May 2008 (retrieved 
from http://www.nzherald.
co.nz/business/news/article.
cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10509183); 
and C Moore ‘It’s hard to feel 
sorry for Toll’ stuff.co.nz 3April 
2008 (retrieved from http://
www.stuff.co.nz/4462810a1865.
html). A comparison with the 
Auckland airport taking suggests 
that the New Zealand government 
is prepared to contemplate 
compensation for foreign New 
Zealand asset holders, but not 
for its own citizens. The same 
asymmetry has also appeared in 
Canadian government decisions 
as a result of international treaty 
obligations (see: Bryan Schwartz 
and Melanie Bueckert (2006) 
‘Regulatory Takings in Canada’ 
Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 5 p485).
72 The uncompensated taking that 
took place in telecommunications 
with the forced restructuring 
of Telecom New Zealand 
Limited in 2006 was not taking 
by agents administering the 
Telecommunications Act. Instead, 
it was an explicit government 
action implemented by changing 
the Telecommunications Act.
73 Neil Quigley (2003) ‘Property 
Rights and Regulation’ 
Competition and Regulation Times 
issue 12 (available at www.iscr.
org.nz) pp1-2.
74 See Richard Hawke (2003) 
‘Courting the Environment’ 
Competition and Regulation Times 
issues 10 and 12 (available at 
www.iscr.org.nz) pp pp8-9 and 
pp6-7. 
75 See, for example: Dennis 
Meuller (2003) Public Choice III. 
Cambridge University Press.
can acquire ‘sensitive land’. The new factor requires 
that consideration be given to ‘whether the overseas 
investment will, or is likely to, assist New Zealand 
to maintain New Zealand control of strategically 
important infrastructure on sensitive land’.
The effect of the amendment was to lead to a 
sharp reduction in AIAL’s share price, wiping an 
estimated $300 million off the value of the company.67 
In response to this, the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable (NZBRT) and the Wellington Regional 
Chamber of Commerce (WRCC) submitted a joint 
complaint to the Regulations Review Committee in 
relation to the government amendments.68 NZBRT 
and WRCC submitted that the regulation:
• trespasses unduly on personal rights and 
liberty;
• appears to make some unusual or unexpected 
use of power conferred by the statute under 
which it is made;
• unduly makes the rights and liberties of persons 
dependent upon administrative decisions which 
are not subject to review on their merits by a 
judicial or other independent tribunal;
• contains matter more appropriate for 
parliamentary enactment; and
• is retrospective (even though this is not expressly 
authorised by the empowering statute).
The Regulations Review Committee upheld parts 
of the complaint but stopped short of disallowing 
the amended regulations.69 The Committee agreed 
with the NZBRT and WRCC that the regulation 
constituted ‘an unusual and unexpected use of the 
regulation-making power’, that it was better suited to 
parliamentary enactment, and that ‘the proliferation 
of clauses similar to this is cause for concern’.
In this case the confiscation was of the right to 
sell to interests outside New Zealand – a subset of the 
right to alienate the property. The private loss from 
the confiscation of this property right may be gauged 
by the loss in the market value of the company as 
a result of the announcement. However, the cost 
to the economy overall – as a result of increased 
uncertainty, deterrence of foreign investment, and 
the selling of assets to foreign investors before these 
assets become large enough to be viewed by the 
government as strategic – is likely to be very much 
higher.70
What is striking about this policy is the absence of 
any formal analysis of the costs of the policy and the 
benefits actually likely to accrue from it. As in so many 
other confiscations of private rights in New Zealand, 
the reaction of the government was facilitated by the 
absence of statutory or constitutional protection of the 
private property rights of shareholders in Auckland 
International Airport. If such protections did exist, 
we can speculate that the government would have 
been required to think more carefully about whether 
the benefits of the policy would really outweigh the 
private costs. This would have produced the benefit 
that the amendment to the Overseas Investment 
Regulations may not have come to pass; but, if it 
had, then the social and economic costs would have 
been reduced by the requirement to compensate 
those losing private rights in this and future similar 
government policy initiatives.71
5.7. Statutory Acts that Devolve the 
Ability to Take 
A summary definition of regulation is that it is a 
taking by agencies authorised by Parliament under 
enabling Acts. It is widespread and there is not 
space in this review to do other than comment on 
it broadly. We comment particularly on regulatory 
taking by the Crown’s agents (rather than directly 
by Parliament) under the Telecommunications Act 
2001,72  the Commerce Act 1986, the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA), and these Acts’ 
amendments. The first two of the Acts devolve to 
the Commerce Commission, in its administration 
of the Telecommunications and Commerce Acts, 
the power to take property rights. The RMA is 
administered by regional and local bodies, who also 
have this devolved power. 
The takings issue and associated costs 
promulgated by regulation have been analysed 
by Quigley (2005)73 in relation to network access 
regulation. The transaction costs of activity under the 
RMA have been the subject of a number of enquiries 
and reports.74 Here we focus on the ways in which 
these Acts facilitate takings of private property rights 
by interest groups and explain why the protection 
of property rights should have a stronger position in 
regulatory decisions under these Acts.
It is now textbook economics that interest 
groups demand regulation in order to better achieve 
their specific (private interest) goals; and that such 
pressure may arise from groups small in number but 
large in influence (concentrated interests) which 
are far from representative of society as a whole 
(the diffuse interest).75 The devolution of statutory 
power to agencies to take property rights lowers the 
cost of actions by special interest groups, increases 
the range and scope of action of these groups, and 
generates a class of agents whose interests lie in the 
process itself. The total cost of decisions to modify 
property rights is composed of both direct costs 
Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation: An Economic Analysis of the Most Fundamental Human Right Not Provided in New Zealand – Page 17
76 This is an argument for merit 
reviews in the case of Commerce 
Act regulatory decisions. 
Administrators of the RMA have 
wide discretion but there are some 
limitations: see, for example, the 
Banks Peninsula District Council 
case discussed later in this section.
77 There is not space here to 
review examples of takings 
without compensation under the 
Commerce Act. But we do note 
that Australian price regulation is 
constrained to limit takings by the 
availability of merit reviews and 
the requirement that the regulator 
should not reduce the credit rating 
of a regulated firm below a given 
benchmark (Australian National 
Electricity Law section 7).
78 This does not mean that 
ownership rights have emerged, 
simply that rights have evolved 
with respect to all aspects of the 
resource. 
79 For example, there may emerge a 
rule of thumb that says that water 
must be pure (to some standard).
80 The effects may even be 
irreversible.
81 There is no ‘absolute standard of 
value’ that provides a basis for the 
absolute prohibition of an activity 
(see footnote 77 and associated 
discussion in the text).
82 This information is taken from the 
Environment Court Decision No. 
C45/2008 (24 April 2008).
and the larger indirect costs of delay and missed 
opportunities relating to investments of a wide 
variety of types. The costs of decisionmaking under 
the Commerce Act and the RMA each reflect the 
administrators of these Acts.
The Telecommunications, Commerce and 
Resource Management Acts and their administrative 
frameworks are all about administering constraints 
on private property rights. The administrators 
are part of the supply of regulation and cannot be 
entirely disinterested participants in the process. 
Indeed, the administrators may be regarded as a 
special interest group as well, through the views 
they develop and their commitment to their record 
on past decisions. Administrators hold dominant 
positions in geographically and functionally defined 
areas and thus are dominant in rights-determination 
activity that has: 
• high costs and pay-offs for principal participants; 
and
• the potential for delay, obfuscation, manipula-
tion, and even corruption.
Placing more weight on private property rights 
would limit the discretionary power of administrators 
of these Acts; it would also limit the influence of 
special interest groups in promulgating claims 
through these administrations which constrain or 
remove the property rights of others. Beneficial 
effects would include more predictable evolution of 
rights over time, lower transaction costs, and higher 
quality of investments. Where rights are not given 
much consideration, the discipline for administrators 
of these Acts is weak.76
The RMA is particularly notable for the power 
that it provides for local body administrators to 
routinely set aside private property rights without 
compensation.  Our contribution is limited to some 
examples which illustrate the point.  
The RMA applies to occupied land in which 
property rights have evolved through use and 
presumption about options for use available to the 
landowner.77 Thus many of those rights are not 
explicitly recognised by legislation. Even where 
social and economic change yields new uses of 
property and requires new rights to be created, 
these rights can be vested in the occupier of the 
property as they would under the rubric of common 
law or presumptive use. 
The RMA is concerned with limiting adverse 
environmental effects of activities, where these 
effects must be evaluated in terms of society’s 
(human) welfare and hence society’s standards 
of value. There cannot be, for example, effects 
that somehow transcend human assessment 
and valuation and for which there is some other 
standard not amenable to human assessment. 
Human assessment may in some cases place a 
very high value on the presence or absence of an 
effect, and society may develop rules of thumb 
on certain effects;79 but these rules must be based 
upon valuation by human society nevertheless. In 
consequence, the existence of some externality 
associated with particular resource use does not 
transcend established systematic treatment of 
rights. In particular, it is not a prima facie case for 
confiscating without compensation the property 
rights that attend such use.
Consider an established resource use that 
is leading to some (adverse) externality – for 
example, pollution. Its occurrence in the past and 
the present, and the fact that it may occur in the 
future, is associated with current rights that permit 
this activity. The classification of the externality as a 
‘bad’80  and its valuation are based on social values: 
its standing in these respects may change over time 
for the reasons given, but at any point in time these 
are judgement calls by society. If society deems the 
social cost to exceed the benefit of the resource 
use activity then it should inhibit that activity – but 
there is no presumption that this should be dealt 
with by extinguishing the rights to that activity 
without compensation. Conceptually at least, the 
compensation should leave the polluter as well off as 
it was without the prohibition of the activity. Indeed, 
if society deems it cannot afford such compensation 
then the benefits of the activity associated with 
pollution exceed the cost of it.81 Property rights thus 
deserve serious consideration in the application of 
Acts used to influence the management of natural 
resources and the environment.
An illustrative case occurred in 1997 when the 
then Banks Peninsula District Council (later to be 
amalgamated with the Christchurch City Council) 
introduced its Proposed District Plan.82 The plan 
included (among other things) provisions that 
reallocated approximately 50,000 hectares (out of a 
total 96,000 hectares) of rural land in Banks Peninsula 
as either landscape protection areas (‘outstanding 
natural landscapes’ – ONL) or coastal protection areas 
(‘coastal natural character landscapes’ – CNCL).
Not surprisingly, given the property rights taking 
that this represented, there was significant adverse 
public reaction. Faced with this reaction the Council 
introduced Variation 2 to the Proposed District Plan 
in 2002, which greatly reduced the ONL and CNCL 
allocation to 30,000 hectares. 
Beneficial 
effects would 
include more 
predictable 
evolution of 
rights over 
time, lower 
transaction 
costs, and 
higher quality  
of investments.
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83 One particular difference is that, on 
ONL/CNCL land, buildings outside 
a cluster and forestry are ‘non-
complying’ activities under the RMA; 
a resource consent is required for 
such activities and the Council may 
either decline the consent or grant 
it subject to conditions. On rural 
land, by contrast, buildings outside 
a cluster and forestry are ‘restricted 
discretionary’ activities; a resource 
consent is required for these 
activities but the Council’s powers to 
decline it or impose conditions are 
restricted to matters it must specify 
in its proposed plan.
84 Taking by administrative agencies 
through imposed district plans 
that reflect the viewpoints of 
special interest groups which 
include the administrative agencies 
themselves has not been confined 
to the authority of the RMA. This 
is illustrated by the Porirua City 
Council’s attempt in October 1991 
to enact its proposed district scheme 
changes No. 6 (Porirua City) & No. 
58 (Horokiwi Section) under the 
authority of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1977. The substance of 
the changes was that certain farms 
would have their land included 
within an extended boundary of 
the Belmont Regional Park. This 
land was to be designated as part 
of the park and have farming use 
become a permitted departure 
(under undefined terms) from park 
use. Ironically, the proposal failed 
because it was deemed illegal under 
the RMA, which by then was in 
force. 
85 Fish and Game New Zealand 
reports that ‘Fish and Game New 
Zealand’ is the collective brand 
name of the New Zealand Fish and 
Game Council and 12 regional Fish 
and Game Councils established in 
1990 to represent the interests of 
anglers and hunters. It also reports 
that it provides coordination of the 
management, enhancement, and 
maintenance of sports fish and 
game pursuant to section 26B of 
the Conservation Act 1987. (http://
www.fishandgame.org.nz/Site/
Features/FeaturesaboutFG.aspx)
86 The NZ Fish and Game Council’s 
Statement of Claim before 
the Wellington High Court 
(CIV-2008-485-2020) seeks, among 
other things, a declaratory judgment 
regarding the construction of 
pastoral leases that ‘... allow public 
access to the land contained in the 
leases provided such access does 
not interfere with the exclusive rights 
of pasturage’. 
87 In this example a special interest 
group would appear to be using 
its statutory ability to tax (that 
is, every hunter and fisher must 
contribute funding irrespective 
of their preference) to further its 
particular interest. It is entitled to do 
this pursuant to section 26F of the 
Conservation Act. 
88 These actions entail substantial 
costs, simply to preserve existing 
rights; and these costs are a factor in 
determining the nature of occupiers. 
It is noteworthy that regulatory 
institutions typically have substantial 
taxpayer-sourced budgets and that, 
under the RMA, rights holders have 
to fund decisions to do with the 
taking of these rights (RMA section 
36).
89 Indeed, Fish and Game New Zealand 
seem to acknowledge this by the 
permission it gives to bird hunting 
preserves: there is no open access 
here nor should there be.
90 These issues are discussed in Lewis 
Evans and Neil Quigley (2004) ‘Out 
to Pasture: Pastoral Leases in the 
21st Century’ Competition and 
Regulation Times issue 13 (available 
at www.iscr.org.nz) pp1-2; and in 
Lewis Evans and Neil Quigley (2005) 
‘Walking over Property Rights’ 
Competition and Regulation Times 
issue 14 (available at www.iscr.org.
nz) p8. 
91 The fact that property rights are 
a widely accepted solution to the 
negative effects that open access 
has on socially desirable resource 
use poses questions as to the 
process and cost benefit of the state 
allocating its funds to this endeavour. 
Nonetheless, there was still concern from 
the public with this proposal, and the Council 
entered into mediation with concerned parties. 
The result was a landscape study undertaken by 
independent consultants and released in 2007 
which reduced the area of ONL and CNCL further 
still to 23,000 hectares. Despite this mediated 
agreement, the Council drastically altered its view 
and determined to increase the area of ONL and 
CNCL to 75,000 hectares – well in excess of even 
the original allocation proposed. The result was 
that the Proposed District Plan was appealed to the 
Environment Court.
The Council’s unilateral decision to reallocate 
rural land to ONL and CNCL land, regardless 
of the amount of land reallocated, is a taking of 
rural landowners’ property rights. The taking 
is a regulatory taking; and it arises because of 
differences in the treatment of forestry and non-
clustered building in ONL and CNCL land, which 
will affect the use to which this land can be put and 
thus the value of the land.83  However, there was no 
compensation offered to affected landowners as a 
result of this taking.
The Environment Court recognised this taking. 
It stated (at paragraph 86 of its decision) that: ‘To 
make barns, forestry, dwellings and tracks non-
complying activities over most of the Peninsula 
would lead to an immediate and serious impediment 
to existing farming activities and inevitably create 
arguments as to existing use rights.’
Nonetheless, there was little precedent or 
legislative basis for the Environment Court to rule 
against the taking. Rather, it found that the taking 
‘would constitute such a significant imposition upon 
the conduct of farming activities’ and that it would 
be inconsistent with the ‘Rural Zone’ section of the 
Proposed District Plan which identified agricultural 
production as both a significant resource and one 
that needed to be managed sustainably.84
We conclude this section about institutions 
with devolved power to take private property 
rights by considering the confounded objectives of 
a government entity that is charged with 
enforcement, regulatory policy and advocacy 
functions. Both the Department of Conservation 
and Fish and Game New Zealand, for example, 
have these multiple functions. Fish and Game New 
Zealand85 implements game-bird and freshwater 
fishing regulations and associated specific taxes, 
is charged with designing these regulations, 
and advocates the notion that the New Zealand 
outdoors should be created a commons through the 
availability of open public access. This is illustrated 
by its current challenge to the long-standing 
presumption that Crown pastoral leases provide 
the lessee with exclusive rights of occupation for 
the term of the lease – which is encapsulated in the 
claim that the public should have access as of right 
to land covered by pastoral leases.86 The first point 
to make is that this example illustrates that in its 
activities Fish and Game New Zealand is advocating 
confiscation of rights which Crown pastoral lessees 
have long presumed that they held (albeit that this is 
to be determined by the courts). The second point 
is that, because Fish and Game is taxpayer funded, 
its actions illustrate the substantial asymmetry 
that may exist between rights holders and special 
interest groups who ‘represent’ popular causes 
that are supported by politicians:87  the resources 
of the latter are very often vastly in excess of those 
of the rights holders.88  The third point to make is 
that property rights are a solution to the problem of 
the commons created by open access.  Overriding 
rights of exclusive occupation will create an outdoor 
commons that will itself require regulation and 
inhibit socially desirable multiple-use activities in a 
world of increasing scarcity.90,91   
The design of regulatory agencies – including 
such factors as separation of function, accountability 
mechanisms, and specification of powers that 
recognise property rights – would complement the 
inclusion of property rights as an element of the 
BORA and improve economic performance. 
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New Zealand has an extraordinary history of 
confiscation of property rights, particularly where 
populist views support national interest arguments 
for policies that confiscate private rights. The 
explicit or implicit application of eminent domain 
without compensation is an ongoing characteristic 
of contemporary New Zealand. 
Although New Zealand has reasonable 
protections of property rights in the ownership of 
the fee simple in land where that land is required by 
government for public works, and although it has a 
process for addressing confiscation of Mäori property 
rights, a statutory or constitutional protection of 
property rights defined in their broad (and correct) 
sense is absent. Thus, New Zealand has left open the 
potential for uncompensated confiscation of a vast 
range of property rights.
If protection of property rights were addressed 
directly in the BORA, as we have advocated, there 
would be deeper consideration of the role of 
property rights in both Parliament and the courts. 
However, it is a limited protection – and Parliament 
has considered and rejected it. 
The role of property rights can be strengthened 
by making regulatory agencies more accountable 
and by requiring them to have greater consideration 
of property rights. Measures such as merit review 
of regulatory decisions, the separation of policy 
formation from the right to regulatory-activity 
income, and limiting state funding of special interest 
groups might improve surety of rights in New 
Zealand and enhance investment in its economy. 
Such measures would be particularly effective if 
there were a broadly based provision included in the 
BORA.
Compensation for confiscation of property rights 
is justified by the loss in economic efficiency that is 
associated with uncertainty about the potential for 
loss from confiscation. Dynamic efficiency is reduced 
by the uncertainty of investment returns that are 
associated with the potential for uncompensated 
confiscation.
Some of the more common justifications for 
confiscation of property rights that have been used 
in New Zealand in the past do not hold up under 
careful scrutiny. Confiscation is not justified by 
lack of clarity in property rights. This is because, 
should any such lack of clarity exist, it is the role 
of the courts to clarify those rights. The courts 
have a substantial common law tradition to draw 
on in doing so. Uncompensated confiscation is not 
justified by actions that are deemed by politicians to 
be ‘in the public interest’. It is too easy for interest 
groups who benefit from government actions but 
bear none of those costs to create the appearance 
of a public benefit when none in fact exists. If there 
is a public interest, its value must be quantified 
against the loss to the private property rights that 
would be destroyed by the action. In the absence of 
this accounting, government will overuse its power 
of eminent domain and will engage in actions that 
impose net costs on society as a whole. 
The point of protection of rights and court 
enforcement of those protections is precisely that 
some rights that need to be protected, and some 
forms of confiscation of those rights, cannot be 
foreseen at present. Our examples illustrate the 
extent to which government action can result in 
uncompensated confiscation of property rights. 
They also illustrate the actions which could be 
avoided if New Zealand recognised that a broadly 
based prohibition on uncompensated government 
taking or destruction of property rights is a human 
right that would improve the social and economic 
performance of the economy.
6. Conclusion
The point of 
protection of 
rights and court 
enforcement 
of those 
protections is 
precisely that 
some rights 
that need to be 
protected, and 
some forms of 
confiscation of 
those rights, 
cannot be 
foreseen at 
present. 
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Country Human Rights 
Legislation
Acknowledgment  
of property rights?
Text in legislationCountry
Australia    No specific human 
rights legislation or 
human rights in the 
constitution
No
Austria Basic Law on the 
General Rights of 
Nationals 1867
Yes Article 5:
Property is inviolable. Expropriation against the will of the owner can 
only occur in cases and in the manner determined by law.
Belgium Constitution of 
Belgium 1970
Yes Article 16:
No one can be deprived of his property except in the case of 
expropriation for a public purpose, in the cases and manner established 
by law, and in return for a fair compensation paid beforehand.
Canada Constitution Act 
1982
Yes 1.  It is hereby recognised and declared that in Canada there have 
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason 
of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person 
and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except by due process of law.
Czech Republic92 Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
and Basic Freedoms 
1992
Yes Article 11
(1)  Everyone has the right to own property. Each owner’s property 
right shall have the same content and enjoy the same protection. 
Inheritance is guaranteed.
…
(4) Expropriation or some other mandatory limitation upon property 
rights is permitted in the public interest, on the basis of law, and for 
compensation.
Denmark Constitutional Act 
of the Kingdom of 
Denmark 1953
Yes Section 73:
The right of property shall be inviolable. No person shall be ordered to 
cede his property except where required by the public weal. It can be 
done only as provided by Statute and against full compensation.
Finland Constitution of 
Finland 1999
Yes Section 15:
(1)  The property of everyone is protected.
(2)  Provisions on the expropriation of property, for public needs and 
against full compensation, are laid down by an Act.
France93 Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and 
Citizen 1789
Yes Article 17:
Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived 
thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly 
demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been 
previously and equitably indemnified.
Appendix I: Treatment of Property Rights as Human Rights in 
OECD Countries
92 http://angl.concourt.cz/angl–verze/rights.php
93 http://www.hrcr.org/docs/frenchdec.html
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Country Human Rights 
Legislation
Acknowledgment  
of property rights?
Text in legislationCountry
Germany Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 1949
Yes Article 14:
(1)  Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their 
content and limits shall be defined by the laws.
…
(3)  Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may 
only be ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature 
and extent of compensation …
Greece The Constitution of 
Greece 2001
Yes Article 17:
(1) Property stands under the protection of the State; the rights, 
however, derived therefrom, may not be exercised in a manner 
detrimental to the public interest.
(2) No one shall be deprived of his property except for public benefit 
which must be duly proven, when and as specified by statute and 
always following full compensation corresponding to the value of 
the expropriated property at the time of the court hearing on the 
provisional determination of compensation.
Hungary Constitution of 
the Republic of 
Hungary 1949
Yes Article 13:
(1)  The Republic of Hungary guarantees the right to property.
(2)  Expropriation shall only be permitted in exceptional cases, when 
such action is in the public interest, and only in such cases and in 
the manner stipulated by law, with provision of full, unconditional 
and immediate compensation.
Iceland94 Constitution of 
Iceland 1944
Yes Article 72:
The right of private ownership shall be inviolate. No one may be obliged 
to surrender his property unless required by public interests. Such a 
measure shall be provided for by law, and full compensation shall be 
paid.
Ireland Constitution of 
Ireland 1937
Yes Article 43:
(1.1) The State acknowledges that man, in virtue of his rational being, 
has the natural right, antecedent to positive law, to the private 
ownership of external goods.
Italy Constitution of the 
Italian Republic 
1947
Yes Article 42:
(2)  Private ownership is recognized and guaranteed by laws 
determining the manner of acquisition and enjoymend [sic] and its 
limits, in order to ensure its social function and to make it accessible 
to all.
(3)  Private property, in cases determined by law and with 
compensation, may be expropriated for reasons of common 
interest.
Japan Constitution of 
Japan 1946
Yes Article 29:
(1)  The right to own or to hold property is inviolable.
(2)  Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public 
welfare.
(3)  Private property may be taken for public use upon just 
compensation therefor [sic].
94 http://www.government.is/constitution
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Country Human Rights 
Legislation
Acknowledgment  
of property rights?
Text in legislationCountry
South Korea Constitution of 
South Korea 1948
Yes Article 23:
(1)  The right to property of all citizens is guaranteed. Its contents and 
limitations are determined by law.
(2)  The exercise of property rights shall conform to the public welfare.
(3)  Expropriation, use, or restriction of private property from public 
necessity and compensation therefore are governed by law. 
However, in such a case, just compensation must be paid.
Luxembourg Constitution of 
Luxembourg 1868
Yes Article 16:
No one may be deprived of his property except on grounds of public 
interest in cases and in the manner laid down by the law and in 
consideration of prior and just compensation.
Mexico Political 
Constitution of the 
United Mexican 
States 1917
Yes Article 14:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or 
rights without a trial by a duly created court in which the essential 
formalities of procedure are observed and in accordance with laws 
issued prior to the act.
Article 27:
Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public 
use and subject to payment of indemnity.
Netherlands Constitution of the 
Netherlands 1983
Yes Article 14:
(1)  Expropriation may take place only in the public interest and on prior 
assurance of full compensation, in accordance with regulations laid 
down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament.
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990
No
Norway Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Norway 
1814
Yes Article 104:
Land and goods may in no case be made subject to forfeiture.
Article 105:
If the welfare of the State requires that any person shall surrender his 
movable or immovable property for the public use, he shall receive full 
compensation from the Treasury.
Poland Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland 
1997
Yes Article 21:
(1)  The Republic of Poland shall protect ownership and the right of 
succession.
(2)  Expropriation may be allowed solely for public purposes and for just 
compensation.
Article 64:
(1)  Everyone shall have the right to ownership, other property rights 
and the right of succession.
Portugal Portuguese 
Constitution 1976
Yes Article 62:
(1)  Everyone is secured, in accordance with the Constitution, the right 
to private property and to its transfer during lifetime or by death.
(2)  The requisition of property or its expropriation for public purposes 
are carried out only on the strength of the law and only against the 
payment of fair compensation.
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Country Human Rights 
Legislation
Acknowledgment  
of property rights?
Text in legislationCountry
Slovak Republic Constitution of the 
Slovak Republic 
1992
Yes Article 20:
(1) Everyone has the right to own property. The ownership right of 
all owners has the same legal content and deserves the same 
protection. Inheritance of property is guaranteed.
…
(4) Expropriation or enforced restriction of the ownership right is 
admissible only to the extent that it is unavoidable and in the 
public interest, on the basis of law, and in return for adequate 
compensation.
Spain Constitution of 
Spain 1978
Yes Article 33:
(1) The right to private property and inheritance is recognized. 
…
(3) No one may be deprived of his property and rights except for 
justified cause of public utility or social interest after proper 
indemnification in accordance with the provisions of law.
Sweden The Instrument of 
Government 1975
Yes Article 18:
Every citizen whose property is requisitioned by means of an 
expropriation order or by any other such disposition shall be guaranteed 
compensation for his loss on the bases laid down in law.
Switzerland Swiss Federal 
Constitution 1999
Yes Article 26:
(1)  Property is guaranteed.
(2)  Expropriation and restrictions of ownership equivalent to 
expropriation are fully compensated.
Turkey Constitution of 
Turkey 1982
Yes Article 35:
(1) Everyone has the right to own and inherit property.
United Kingdom95 Human Rights Act 
1998
Yes Schedule 1, Part II, Article 1:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by 
the general principles of international law.
United States Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution of 
the United States of 
America 1791
Yes Amendment V:
No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.
Source (unless otherwise noted): International Constitutional Law (http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html).
95 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/ukpga–19980042–en–3#sch1-pt2
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